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SUMMARY 
Based on available data on various organisations and networks, the article explores some key 
properties of the structure of a terrorist organisation. Analytical focus is on lower levels of 
organisational hierarchy, where network structure with exponential distribution of the number of links 
among network nodes is clearly visible. Such networks tend to grow organically, are very efficient in 
information diffusion, and are robust regarding stochastic failures and targeted attacks. These network 
features are illustrated by recent example based on network data about September 11, 2001 attacks on 
New York and Washington. 
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INTRODUCTION 
After catastrophic terrorist attacks by kidnapped airlines on New York and Washington in 
September 2001 the interest for al-Qaeda terrorist organisation in public and media rose 
immediately. Experts and analysts all over the world started to offer various explanations of 
al-Qaeda’s origins, membership recruitment, modes of operation, as well as of possible ways 
of its disruption. Journalists in search of hot topics took over and publicized most of the 
publicly available materials, often revising them further and making them even more 
intriguing and attractive for wide audiences. 
One could thus read or hear that al-Qaeda is “a net that contains independent intelligence”, 
that it “functions as a swarm”, that it “gathers from nowhere and disappears after action”, that 
it is “an ad hoc network”, “an atypical organisation”, extremely hard to destroy, especially by 
traditional anti-terrorist methods. In a similar tone, the day after July 7, 2005 simultaneous 
explosions in London subway British Home Secretary referred to the attack as coming “out of 
the blue in a way that there was no knowledge of beforehand in any respect whatsoever” [1]. 
This statement is all the more surprising when we know that many state intelligence and 
security services have been exerting serious efforts for more than four years in attempting to 
disrupt al-Qaeda network. Descriptions like the ones above sound extraordinary, sometimes 
almost fantastic, and provoke questions such as which master mind, if any, created such 
powerful organisation and what efforts are needed to put it into operation. Fortunately, the 
amount of concrete data and facts on al-Qaeda and similar organisations is constantly 
growing and our understanding of their ways of functioning is improving. 
The main purpose of this article is to shed some light on the structure of contemporary, 
relatively decentralised terrorist organisations of which al-Qaeda is a primary example. The 
intent is also to show how and why these networked organisations possess particular 
properties. As we shall see, many of these regularities are common for a whole spectrum of 
organisational forms, of which terrorist organisations are only a small part. 
HIERARCHICAL ELEMENTS OF ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE 
Military, paramilitary and other similar organisations have usually been associated with 
hierarchical structure. Execution of orders without complaints, minimal deviation from plans, 
close coordination resulting from strict division of labour, and precise common guidelines are 
all deemed necessary for the efficiency and control of such organisations. 
Numerous terrorist organisations, especially those preoccupied with ideological or nationalist 
goals, are structured according to similar principles. Although this may sound paradoxical, 
these organisations attempt to strictly control the amount of violence. Violence is usually 
subordinate to the achievement of other, often political, goals such as acquiring sympathies in 
public, attracting attention, exerting pressure needed for political negotiations, exhausting the 
opposing side, and lowering its morale. For example, it is probably more than a pure 
coincidence that the IRA refrained from using violence some ten days after the London subway 
attacks [2]. The desire to distinguish itself from perpetrators of massive, non-discriminating 
violent acts was likely one of the factors influencing IRA’s decision. To control the amount 
of violence it is necessary that organisation’s “political arms” control terrorist activities. 
Lower-ranking members need to be under strict control of higher headquarters in order to 
prevent undesirable individual transgressions. This is why the organisations like the Red 
Brigades, ETA, or IRA are strictly hierarchically structured [3] (see Fig. 1 also). 
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Figure 1. Organisational structure of the IRA in the second half of the nineties: hierarchical 
organisation with territorially organised divisions (based on [4]). 
relatively recently are oriented towards maximisation of casualties and terror. For them, terror is 
more the aim in itself, than it is the means of political fight. Such groups have much less interest 
in maintaining strict hierarchical structure, which would ensure operative control over terrorist 
activities. One of such groups is al-Qaeda, especially when viewed as a wider structure encompassing 
various groups and individuals inspired by the spiritual leadership of Osama bin Laden. 
Al-Qaeda in a narrower sense, as an organisation formed and led by bin Laden, also possesses 
hierarchical structure [5 – 7], but hierarchy is only one form of its complex structuring. 
Figure 2 presents the top of al-Qaeda organisation in the way the organisation of corporations 
or public institutions is usually depicted. The organisation is headed by Emir – the leader, 
which is the indisputable position of Osama bin Laden. The Emir is supported by Shura or 
the High Council, the activities of which are not much known of. In 2001 Shura supposedly 
had twenty to thirty members, many of which were not living in Afghanistan. Members of 
Shura have high authority and high degree of freedom, but are at the same time absolutely 
loyal to bin Laden and the organisation. The frequency of their meetings, their ways of 
communication, and the content of Shura’s decisions are not publicly known. 
In 2001 al-Qaeda had four organisational units, called committees, responsible for political 
and religious, financial, military, including terrorist, activities, and for propaganda and 
relations with media (Fig. 2). Military committee consisted of three departments. One of them 
was responsible for external military activities conducted during nineties in Chechnya, 
Bosnia, Kashmir, and perhaps some other countries affected by wars. Another department 
supervised terrorist operations all over the world. The third one was responsible for internal 
operations in Afghanistan, where al-Qaeda had entire military units. Special training camps 
were managed by this department and used for recruitment and training of new members 
from all over the world. 





























Figure 2. Hierarchical structure of al-Qaeda’s core in 2001. 
However, presented structural analysis, describing al-Qaeda as a hybrid organisation with its 
highest levels structured primarily according to functional principles, and with divisional structure 
at the lower levels, does not contain all the elements needed for understanding its functioning. 
First, it must be noted that the formal structure of Figure 2 does not perfectly match all the 
relations and connections existing within the organisation, which are in reality much more 
complex. Additional relations including personal ties and multiple roles, which certain 
individuals attain, often exist aside from the specified lines of control. All of them constitute 
a network organisation, the lower hierarchical levels of which will be examined more closely 
in the forthcoming chapters. Moreover, connections between individuals and organisational 
units are often multiple, so that in reality multiple networks and hierarchies often exist. Thus 
we may speak about a whole meta-network of networks consisting of the operative network, 
the financial network, the administrative network, the network of trust, the knowledge 
network, the information network, and so on. The same node
1
 may have different roles in 
these different networks. The complexity of the meta-network makes the structure of a 
terrorist network organisation extremely difficult to uncover [8]. 
Second, it is questionable whether a fundamentalist terrorist organisation can be analysed in 
the same ways and with the same tools as those used in structural analysis of modern business 
corporations. Membership in al-Qaeda undoubtedly has important spiritual dimension, and the 
organisation is at least as similar to a secret religious society as it is to a modern corporation. 
This opens another view on the structure of the organisation as a series of layers [9], which 
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are often depicted as concentric circles. Members of the organisation believe that each 
subsequently inner circle is situated closer to a comprehensive revelation of the absolute truth 
in the centre (Fig. 3). The inner circles draw their indisputable authority in operative and 
tactical decisions from the assumed divine superiority. Advancement in such organisation is 
not so much related to the merits or deeds of an individual, as to his or her inner 
transformation in accordance with the organisation’s spiritual teachings. Initiation rituals at 
certain organisational levels symbolise this spiritual development. The increased willingness 
to act in accordance with the organisation’s goals is an important consequence of the 
increasingly resolute religious conviction. 
The al-Qaeda’s leadership does not exercise direct control over all activities of the 
organisation, not even over most of the activities carried out in the name of the organisation. 
This is not only because there is no need to control the amount of violence for attaining 
political goals. Control of violence is also not possible for technical and organisational 
reasons. What is then the role of leadership in such an organisation? 
The leadership provides motivation for actions of the followers – a kind of a common vision 
or a narrative. It also provides organisational structure, doctrine and methods of operation, 
and, particularly, the means of personally connecting members of the organisation and the 
means of communication between them [10; p.324]. Using military terminology, for a 
network to achieve “self-synchronisation of dispersed forces”, needed for its functioning, the 
leadership must ensure the unity of effort, define commander’s intent and determine the rules 























































Figure 3. Concentric structure of al-Qaeda as a secret religious society. 
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It must be admitted that the al-Qaeda’s leadership was exceptionally successful in fulfilling 
its duties. The commander’s intent, i.e. the vision to fight for, was provided to membership 
through fatwas – religious decrees requesting death of Americans, their allies, and other 
infidels. The unity of effort was ensured through common fundamentalist Sunni religion, and 
reinforced by personal ties and mutual trust developed among the members in training camps 
in Afghanistan and in religious schools in Pakistan. The rules of engagement, including 
organisation, doctrine, techniques and methods of operation, were also developed through 
training, and they were even coded in a kind of training manual [12]. 
Once developed, “self-synchronised network of dispersed forces” may function without any 
direct interference or control of the leadership. The role of bin Laden, and probably of 
al-Zarqawi today in Iraq, becomes similar to the role of a manager of a business incubator [13]. 
While the manager provides entrepreneurs, or terrorists in this particular case, with start-up 
conditions, teaches them methods of operation, connects them with one another, monitors 
their more promising projects, and provides some inspiration and guidance, the initiatives and 
actions of newly-emerging leaders are autonomous in all other respects. 
NETWORK ELEMENTS OF ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE 
Most expert analyses and media reports on al-Qaeda’s structure agree that all of al-Qaeda’s 
organisational levels are structured according to hybrid network-hierarchical principles. 
Although complete data on the organisation are inaccessible, important studies of certain 
parts of al-Qaeda’s network have been done. Valdis E. Krebs published one of particularly 
informative articles, reconstructing in considerable detail the portion of the network that 
prepared and executed September 11, 2001 attacks in the U.S. [14]. Much of the rest of our 
work is based on Krebs’ findings. 
Figure 4 depicts the network of airplane kidnappers – perpetrators of the attacks on New York 
and Washington. Four groups of kidnappers, each of which kidnapped one airplane, are 
marked with four different symbols for network nodes. Three groups consisted of five 
members, and one group of only four. One group did not complete its terrorist mission 
because passengers distracted terrorists enough to miss the planned target, but unfortunately 
not enough to escape crashing the plane. According to Christopher Allen’s analysis [15], 
based on studying size of functional groups successfully collaborating over the Internet, 
successful small teams consist of 5-9 members, and the optimal size is 7-8. It is interesting to 
note that the only terrorist group that did not complete its mission had only four members, 
which is one below Allen’s lower bound of five. 
Let us now focus on the number of connections between team members and on the topology 
of the network. Bold lines in Figure 4 denote “old ties” between terrorists that had existed 
even before preparation of the attacks began. These ties of trust are typically formed through 
common schooling or common lodging. We can see that the kidnappers were only weakly 
connected, as each of them personally knew only three other network members on average. 
The average length of shortest path
2
 between two nodes of the network is as high as 4,75, 
meaning that members were socially quite distant from one another. Low connectedness 
certainly favours secrecy, but it may impede network’s operability. 
During preparation of the attacks, kidnappers connected themselves more closely, increasing 
thus network’s operability. These newly formed ties are denoted in Figure 4 with thin grey 
lines. It remains unclear, however, why had not all members of the same team known each 
other prior to boarding the planes. In teams marked with circles and pentagons, for example, 
each member knew maximally two other members of the same team. 
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Figure 5 depicts the network of airplane kidnappers, augmented with nodes representing their 
supporting assistants. According to Krebs’ analysis, this wider network had 62 members in 
total, of which 19 were kidnappers, and 43 assistants: organisers, couriers, financiers, scouts, 
counterfeiters etc. Allen found that successfully functioning large networks typically 
comprise 25-80 members, with optimal size between 45 and 50. Again, a close match exists 
between the results of Allen’s analysis of collaborating networked groups and this particular 
example of a terrorist group. 
 
Figure 4. The network of airplane kidnappers participating in September 11, 2001 attacks in the U.S. 
 
 
Figure 5. The network of airplane kidnappers and their supporters preparing September 11, 2001 
attacks in the U.S. 
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Inspection of this network by standard measures of network structure [16 – 18] reveals firstly 
its low connectedness. A member of this network holds only 4,9 connections with other 
members on average
3
, which means that average members are rather isolated from the rest of 
the network. (Try to imagine a group of 62 people of which you know only five – you would 
probably hardly feel a sense of belonging to such a group, or hardly expect any coordinated 
action of such a group.) Connectedness measure
4
 of this network is only 0,08, meaning that 
only 8 % of all possible connections in the network really exist. 
In spite of the low connectedness, however, nodes of this network are relatively close. The 
average length of shortest path between two nodes is 2,9, and the average closeness
5
 of nodes 
is 0,35. Betweenness
6
 is another important measure in social network analysis and it indicates 
a node’s importance for communication among other nodes. The average betweenness of this 
network is 0,032, indicating relatively high average redundancy. However, betweenness of forty 
nodes is in fact less than 1 %, and only six nodes have betweenness higher than 10 %. These 
six nodes are obviously critical for information flow, especially the one with betweenness of 
almost 60 %, meaning that almost 60 % of communication paths among other nodes pass 
through this central node. This node represents Mohamed Atta, the leading organiser of the 
attack whose central position in the network is confirmed by other centrality indicators as well. 
The values of centralisation measures
7
 equal 23 % for degrees, 48 % for closeness, and even 
56 % for betweenness of nodes. These results imply that links are relatively evenly 
distributed among nodes, but that some nodes’ placements in network’s topology are more 
significant than others’. Such nodes are in favourable positions regarding information 
diffusion and distribution of power, and are often referred to as central. 
Distribution of degrees of nodes is particularly interesting. Degrees of nodes are exponentially 
distributed: the degree of most nodes is small, while only few nodes have high degree (Fig. 6). 
This property characterises the so-called scale-free networks [19, 20; pp.104-111]
8
, commonly 
found in diverse areas of science, technology, and society. The same property possess, for 
example, many traffic networks, networks of social contacts and social influence, networks of 
Internet servers, and many others, including also brain’s neural network. Scale-free networks 
form spontaneously, without needing a particular plan or interventions of a central authority. 
Nodes that are members of the network for a longer time, that are better connected with other 
nodes, and that are more significant for network’s functioning, are also more visible to new 
members, so that the new members spontaneously connect more readily to such nodes than to 





















Figure 6. Distribution of degrees of nodes in the network of kidnappers and their supporters. 
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The al-Qaeda network was also organically formed, under influences of external conditions, 
operative needs and initiatives of group members. Most likely, the only important network’s 
property resulting from intentional design is low connectedness, which is dictated by the need 
for secrecy and security of operation. Al-Qaeda’s Training Manual states: “Cell or cluster 
methods should be adopted by the Organization. It should be composed of many cells whose 
members do not know one another, so that if a cell member is caught, the other cells would 
not be affected, and work would proceed normally.” [12; Third Lesson]. 
Several other properties of scale-free networks have significant influence on network’s 
functioning, so that the network may often appear as possessing almost supernatural 
properties. This may explain quotations describing al-Qaeda in the introductory chapter, 
whose authors were probably under impressions of a similar kind. The next two chapters will 
describe two of the potentially perplexing properties: speed of information diffusion through 
the network, and the network’s resilience to loss of nodes. 
INFORMATION DIFFUSION THROUGH THE NETWORK 
When designing transport networks and telecommunication systems, including Internet 
networks, one of the most critical requirements is on the network’s capacity of transferring 
certain amounts of commodities or information over certain distances in certain time. 
Methods of graph theory are often used for estimating network’s capacity, including 
identification of directions, capacities, and perhaps transfer costs for each of the links. 
Unfortunately, in the case of al-Qaeda network such methods are not particularly helpful 
because of their exceedingly demanding data requirements. Therefore we shall attempt to 
illustrate al-Qaeda network’s information diffusion capabilities by means of an illustrative 
example. The example will use three networks of different structural types, but otherwise 
similar general properties. All three networks consist of 62 nodes. Attempts were also made 
at keeping the average degree of nodes close to 5 for all three networks. Schematic 





Figure 7. Three networks of different structural types with similar general properties: a) network 
with exponentially distributed degrees of nodes, b) network with uniformly distributed degrees of 
nodes, c) strictly hierarchical network. 
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First of the three networks (Fig. 7a) is Krebs’ reconstruction of the network of airplane 
kidnappers and their supporters that we have already encountered in Figure 5. As we have 
also already noticed, this network’s distribution of degrees of nodes is exponential. Degrees 
of nodes belonging to the second of the three networks (Fig. 7b) are uniformly distributed and 
each node is connected to exactly five other nodes. We can easily imagine this network as 
spreading over a sphere so that the outward-stretching links at borders of Figure 7b in fact 
connect nodes at the opposite borders. Such network does not possess any central or marginal 
nodes. As one can hardly find an example of organisation that would be structured in this 
way, this case is of primarily theoretical significance. Finally, the third network (Fig. 7c) 
represents standard hierarchical organisation with the structure of a tree. Note that the number 
of nodes in such network is always one more than the number of links, so that it is not 
possible to form the hierarchical network in which average degree of nodes would be five. As 
closest approximation we chose hierarchical tree consisting of 62 nodes, with degrees of all 
nodes at the second highest hierarchical level equalling five. This requirement automatically 
generates the rest of this network’s structure. 
In the first experiment, we were interested in speed at which information originating from the 
central node diffuses through the rest of each of the three networks. In the case of exponential 
network central node is located close to the middle of a graph. As we have already noted, this 
node possesses highest values of all three centrality indicators: degree, closeness, and 
betweenness. In the case of uniform network no node is distinguished by its centrality, so that 
the choice of the central information source is completely arbitrary. We have simply chosen the 
node in the middle of the graphical representation (Fig. 8b). Finally, in the case of hierarchical 
network central node is the one at the top of the hierarchy. It does not possess highest degree 
of all the nodes in the network, but is outstanding by its closeness and betweenness values. 
We assume that, in each of the networks, information is released by the central node and that 
it diffuses through the rest of network in discrete steps. In the first step central node 
dispatches information to all of its neighbouring nodes, and in each next step each of the 
nodes that received information in the previous step dispatches it further to all of its 
neighbours. It is assumed that the time to traverse each of the links equals exactly one step, 
that there are no information losses, and that all links are of sufficient capacity to diffuse 
information further without any distortion. Time dynamics of information diffusion is 
schematically represented in Figure 8. Identically shaded areas comprise all the nodes that 
received information in the same time-step. Darker shading corresponds to areas that received 
information earlier. For each network, Table 1 contains percentages of nodes that received 
information in specified time-steps. 
As can be seen in Figure 8 and Table 1, information diffusion from centre to periphery was 
slowest in the uniform network. The hierarchical and the exponential network both transferred 
information much faster, in only three time-steps. However, the transfer process was much 
more efficient in the exponential than in the hierarchical network. After only one step, 
information reached almost 40 % of nodes in the exponential, and only 8 % of nodes in the 
hierarchical network. After two steps, information reached over 90 % of nodes in the exponential 
network, and only about one third of the total number of nodes in the hierarchical network. 
In the second experiment we investigated the speed of information diffusion in the opposite 
direction: from periphery to centre, i.e. the source of information is now a peripheral node. In 
the exponential network our choice for the starting peripheral node was one of the nodes located 
furthest from the central one, and with the value of betweenness equalling zero (Fig. 9a). 
In the uniform network the choice of both centre and periphery is completely arbitrary, so 
we simply repeated the same experiment as in the previous case. In the hierarchical  network 






Figure 8. Information diffusion from centre to periphery: identically shaded areas comprise all the 
nodes receiving information in the same time-step. 
Table 1. Percentage of nodes that received information for each time-step and each network – the 
case of information diffusion from centre to periphery. 
Network Step 0 Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4 Step 5 Step 6 
Exp. 2 % 39 % 94 % 100 %    
Unif. 2 % 10 % 23 % 39 % 61 % 86 % 100 % 
Hier. 2 % 8 % 34 % 100 %    
one of the nodes from the bottom of hierarchy was chosen as the starting peripheral node. 
Time dynamics for the case of information diffusion from periphery to centre is 
schematically represented in Figure 9. Darker shading again corresponds to areas that 
received information earlier. Table 2 summarizes percentages of nodes that received 
information in each of the time-steps. 
Information diffusion was in this case slower in both the exponential and the hierarchical 
network. Diffusion through the exponential network completed fastest. What may surprise us 
is that the uniform network was in this case more efficient than the hierarchical network: in 
each intermediary time-step larger percentage of nodes received information in the former 
than in the latter network. This finding is in accordance with numerous empirical 
observations of serious inefficiencies in processing data and initiatives issuing from bottoms 
of hierarchies towards their upper levels. Most importantly, this particular case of an alarm 
notice, coming from a peripheral node and disseminating towards upper hierarchical levels, is 
typical in data gathering for intelligence purposes. It is therefore not surprising that 
restructuring of the existing hierarchical organisational structures became one of hot topics in 
the U.S. intelligence community after September 11, 2001 attacks. 






Figure 9. Information diffusion from periphery to centre: identically shaded areas comprise all the 
nodes receiving information in the same time-step. 
Table 2. Percentage of nodes that received information for each time-step and each network – the 
case of information diffusion from periphery to centre. 
Network Step 0 Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4 Step 5 Step 6 
Exp. 2 % 3 % 13 % 21 % 56 % 100 %  
Unif. 2 % 10 % 23 % 39 % 61 % 86 % 100 % 
Hier. 2 % 3 % 8 % 15 % 34 % 53 % 100 % 
The ease of information diffusion through networks with exponentially distributed degrees of 
nodes is often referred to as a “small-world property” [20, Ch. 3], meaning that it does not 
take many steps to get from one node to another. Together with secrecy of operation, this 
property significantly improves operational tempo of terrorist network’s activities. In other 
words, terrorist operations can today be quickly prepared with very moderate requirements for 
personnel and assets, and without giving many clues at what is going on to external observers. 
In the right moment network may activate instantly, so that an observer is really left with the 
impression of terrorists “gathering from nowhere and disappearing after action”. The 
metaphor of terrorists gathering as a swarm, and then quickly dispersing after action is also in 
place [21]. Another intriguing and analytically useful image is that of a critical mass of passive 
supporters to terrorists all over the world, who can rapidly self-organise and, through the 
process of “filtering”, enable execution of deadly terrorist attacks anywhere in the world [22]. 
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NETWORK’S RESILIENCE TO ATTACKS AND LOSS OF NODES 
Resilience of a terrorist network in cases of arrestment, death, or any other loss of their 
members is of utmost importance for the network’s survival. Conversely, network’s 
vulnerability in such cases is critically important for successfully destabilising the network. 
There are at least three indicators of network’s destabilisation [23]: first, the information flow 
through the network is seriously reduced, possibly to zero; second, the network, as a decision 
body, can no longer reach consensus; and third, network, as an organisation, loses the ability 
to effectively perform its tasks. 
Removal of a central node in a hierarchical network has drastic consequences for the 
information flow, decision making, and task execution. Therefore very detailed rules 
regulating inheritance of commanding duties exist in, e.g., military organisations for 
protection against the loss of a commander. 
Investigations of networks with exponentially distributed degrees of nodes show, however, 
extraordinary resilience of such networks to loss of nodes. This is the consequence of their 
redundant design, which is particularly important, thoroughly investigated, and intentionally 
applied in traffic, telecommunication and other technical networks. Robustness of terrorist 
networks is further enhanced by their multi-layered structure. As we have already noted, 
multiple connections exist among the members so that the whole network may be viewed as 
one huge meta-network of various functional sub-networks. Obviously, removal of one node 
does not affect each of the sub-networks uniformly, so that many sub-networks will often not 
experience serious disturbances. 
Finally, network’s flexibility is an element contributing perhaps most to its robustness. As 
there are no strict hierarchical rules, individuals easily change their roles depending on 
external circumstances. Therefore, when a node is lost, surrounding nodes quickly establish 
new connections and share responsibilities of the lost member. The network changes its 
structure and adapts to new circumstances without prolonged loss of functionality. The 
process of recovery is completely different than in hierarchical organisations, where the 
organisational structure does not change when a node is lost, but another member occupies 
the empty position and takes over all the responsibilities of the predecessor. 
Robustness analysis of scale-free networks was first motivated by safety requirements for 
technical networks, but its results are equally relevant for social networks of the same type [24]. 
These results show that scale-free networks are exceptionally resilient to the loss of a random 
node. This is not surprising if we remember that most of the nodes in a scale-free network 
possess only few connections. Loss of such nodes does obviously not have significant impact 
on network’s functioning. More surprising, however, is the fact that scale-free networks may 
suffer, without being destroyed, random losses as serious as 80 % of their total number of 
nodes. Another surprising finding is that scale-free networks are often not destroyed even 
when their central node is removed. As already noted, redundancy and flexibility enable 
network’s quick restructuring without losses of functionality. To destroy a scale-free 
network, one must simultaneously remove 5-15 % of its nodes, primarily those in central 
positions
9
. Only such simultaneous attack can destroy redundancies in network connections 
in the amount needed to prevent any possibility of network’s recovery. 
Let us check this last property for the network of airplane kidnappers and their supporters 
from Figure 5. Successive removal of central nodes from this network is schematically 
represented in Figure 10. 
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Figure 10. Network’s destruction by successive removals of its central nodes: after three removals 
network disintegrates into two mutually disconnected parts. 
As can be seen, three central nodes need to be removed in order to break up this network. 
This must be done almost simultaneously to prevent network’s recovery. Three nodes make 
up 5 % of the total number of nodes in this network, which is in accordance with the 
theoretical results cited above. Taking into account that, for secrecy reasons, the number of 
connections in a terrorist network is kept near minimum, it is not surprising that this network 
is slightly more sensitive to removal of nodes than technical networks, i.e. that it already 
breaks down at the lower theoretical bound for percentage of nodes that need to be removed. 
CONCLUSIONS 
This article shows that terrorist organisations like al-Qaeda present no especially ingenious 
case of organisational design, but that there exist spontaneously emerging and nevertheless 
perfectly sensible regularities between the structure of such organisations and their manifest 
properties. We still need to learn how to detect these regularities and how to understand them 
better. These regularities are not typical of only terrorist organisations. Networked 
organisations are present in almost all areas of life and their influence on our social and 
economic life is important and probably still increasing. Sales networks, open source code 
community, anti-globalisation movement, and scientific research networks are only some of the 
examples that have recently attracted much attention in public and in scientific communities. 
As we have argued here, in some circumstances these networked organisations have 
significant advantages over classical hierarchies. Understanding and knowledge gathered in 
studying network structures in one area can often be more or less directly applied to 
organising complex systems in some other area. For example, problems of organising a 
number of autonomous or semi-autonomous software agents to perform business transactions 
on Internet or some other computer network are in certain aspects similar to problems of 
organising networks such as al-Qaeda. As another example, in the “net-war” of the future, 
networked organisation would consist of platforms equipped with various sensors or arms, 
operating on a battlefield with considerable autonomy, and exchanging information with each 
other. The real strength of such systems would lay not so much in their number or firepower, 
as in flexibility and coordination emerging from their networked organisation. 
Understandably, very often and especially in situations where strict control over all parts of 
organisation is necessary, where efficient use of resources is paramount, or where strict 
responsibility and traceability are critical, hierarchies will still find their application domain. 
REMARKS 
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1
Using the terminology of graph theory, which is fundamental for the network analysis, a network 
will be sometimes called a graph, members of the network will be referred to as nodes of the graph, 
while the connections between members will be referred to as links of the graph. 
2
A path is an alternating sequence of nodes and links, starting and ending with a node. The length of a 
path is defined as the number of links in it. 
3
This means that average degree of nodes is 4,9, where degree of a node represents the number of 
links coming out of the node. 
4
Connectedness of a given network is the ratio of actually existing number of links in this network 
and the maximal number of links that would be possible in a network with the same number of nodes, 
where each node would be linked to each other. 
5
Closeness of a node is an inverse of the average length of shortest paths from the given node to all 
other nodes of the network. 
6
Betweenness of a node is the number of shortest paths that go through that node, divided by the 
number of shortest paths in total. 
7
Degree, closeness, and betweenness of a node are varieties of centrality indicators. Each centrality 
indicator has its corresponding centralisation measure. The centralisation measure measures 
unevenness in distribution of centrality indicator’s values over all network’s nodes. Higher 
centralisation means higher unevenness. 
8
The term “scale-free network” originates from the fact that for such networks the ratio of number of 
nodes with degree k  and the number of nodes with degree k  does not depend on the scaling factor 
k  for any fixed 0 . This property is also related to the property of self-similarity, which indicates 
fractal structure of a network. 
9
The exact percentage is dependent on the amount of redundancy and, to some extent, on the choice 
of nodes to be removed. 
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SAŽETAK 
Na temelju dostupnih podataka o različitim organizacijama i mrežama članak istražuje neka ključna svojstva 
strukture terorističkih organizacija. Težište analize je na nižim razinama organizacijske hijerarhije, gdje je jasno 
vidljiva mrežna struktura s eksponencijalnom distribucijom broja lukova između čvorova mreža. Takve mreže 
rastu organički, vrlo su učinkovite u širenju informacija te robusne s obzirom na slučajne gubitke čvorova i na 
ciljane napade. Navedene osobine mreža ilustrirane su na primjeru terorističke mreže koja je izvela napade na 
New York i Washington 11. rujna 2001. 
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